Stegomastodon Facts and Figures

Stegomastodon Facts and Figures Name: Stegomastodon (Greek for roof nippled tooth); pronounced STEG-oh-MAST-oh-don Habitat: Plains of North and South America Historical Epoch: Late Pliocene-Modern (three million-10,000 years ago) Size and Weight: About 12 feet long and 2-3 tons Diet: Plants Distinguishing Characteristics: Moderate size; long, upward-curving tusks; complex cheek teeth About Stegomastodon Its name sounds impressive- like a cross between a Stegosaurus and a Mastodon- but you might be disappointed to learn that Stegomastodon is actually Greek for roof-nippled tooth, and that this prehistoric elephant wasnt even a true Mastodon, being more closely related to Gomphotherium than to the genus to which all Mastodons belonged, Mammut. (We wont even mention Stegodon, another elephant family to which Stegomastodon was only distantly related.) As you may already have guessed, Stegomastodon was named after its unusually complex cheek teeth, which allowed it to eat such un-pachyderm-like foods as grass. More importantly, Stegomastodon is one of the few ancestral elephants (besides Cuvieronius) to have prospered in South America, where it survived until historical times. These two pachyderm genera made their way south during the Great American Interchange, three million years ago, when the Panamanian isthmus rose up from the seafloor and connected North and South America (and thus allowed the native fauna to migrate in both directions, with sometimes deleterious effects on native populations). To judge by the fossil evidence, Stegomastodon populated the grasslands east of the Andes mountains, while Cuvieronius preferred higher, cooler altitudes. Given that it survived until shortly after the last Ice Age, 10,000 years ago, its almost certain that Stegomastodon was preyed on by the indigenous human tribes of South America- which, along with inexorable climate change, drove this pachyderm to complete extinction.

How is toy selection associated with gender-roles and acceptance in Essay

How is toy selection associated with gender-roles and acceptance in the play ground with 5yr old children - Essay Example This paper intends to get preliminary research on the way at which children below the age of five years behave while at the play ground. It will analyze the findings of how they will react or interact with each other as a result of possessing a specific kind of toy. It will also from an analytical point of view look at the relationship between the choice of a toy by a target participant and their perceived roles while playing with each other in the play ground. The main aim of this study is to understand the relationship between children’s toy selection and gender-roles and also acceptance as observed in the play grounds. The findings are replicated to conform to what other researchers in the past have linked the three issues above. Specifically, I shall become a participant/observant in the whole process and take part in noting the behaviors of the children with reference to the toys they own. A co-nomination type of monitoring is applied while singling out every child in terms of the various types of toys owned by the children. By summarizing how many social interactions and the rate of acceptance of each child to their peers There is an already built up assumption that children tend to associate more with specific toys and may become afflicted with specific types of the toys. The roles of these children become more pronounced by the way they particularly take care of these toys. It is believed that children begin to adopt responsible behaviors right at the beginning of this tender age. In addition, there is an assumption that more children tend to acquire and strengthen their roles in the society by exercising them through their toys. This hypothesis is strong and can guide people including parents to build on that basis. Female and male children while at this stage are not sensitive of their roles within their peers but there is some sense of responsiveness to some kind of actions by the

Organisation and behaviour Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words - 1

Organisation and behaviour - Assignment Example Coca Cola has a dynamic organizational structure. This enables the entity to address the countless managerial challenges it encounters. The entity organizational structure combines various managerial structures. The managerial models include functional, central, production and regional management. The fusion of these models generates a dynamic structure, which suits Coca Cola. The regional management enables the entity to address regional challenges, which the entity is encountering. The entity adopted a regional structure, which ensures the distribution of its products in the various sections of the globe where it has clientele. This kind of structure also ensures that the location of its production facilities enables reduction of cost and unproblematic accessibility of its products to its clientele. Regional management also enables the entity address variation in culture globally. The variation in regions means that organizational culture will vary depending on the geographic locat ions. However, the organizational culture is largely similar despite the variation in geographic location. Coca Cola organization culture entails various aspects such as team building, performance management, training and motivating employees. The organization has also established certain values which the entity seeks to inculcate in its employees. The virtues ensure that there are good inter-employee relationships. Furthermore, these values ensure proper service to the clientele. Coca Cola’s organizational culture is a vital constituent of the entity’s corporate governance policy. Coca Cola’s corporate culture is friendly and innovative. It seeks to improve the employee’s career by ensuring that employee progress professionally. Professional advancement is an imperative way of motivating employees. Motivating employees is a vital since it will boost productivity in the entity. The organization has laid emphasis on teamwork. Organizational teams are critical since

Questions on Global Issues Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Questions on Global Issues - Essay Example egitimacy as a source of national identity, will open doors for other mediums such as religion and culture to fill the void for nationalism and further threaten the state. This struggle is reminiscent of what Samuel Huntington wrote in his book The Clash of Civilization, he notes that in the post-Cold War era, wars and conflicts will be fought not because of economic or ideological reasons, but because of cultural phenomenon brought about by clashes among civilizations. He argues that Western instruments of modernity will create conflicts with the non-Western world due to the isolation and aggression that it will create. With globalization bringing nations and cultures together, non-Western cultures may feel isolated and threatened. In order to protect themselves, and with no apparent formal channel to do so under the nation-state, religion –being inextricably linked and identified with culture, becomes a crucial refuge and a powerful tool to fight back. However, due to the changes in today’s world – deeper integration between nations and economies, rapid developments in communications and technology (including instruments of war), blurring of national borders, and a growing animosity towards the Western world due to the spread of information among different nations and cultures; conflict, including those propelled by religious beliefs, have taken a new and more complicated face. Religious warfare, unlike the traditional conduct of war, has become more complicated to address because, as Mark Juergensmeyer notes, religious struggle (1) gives the moral authority for extremists to embark on â€Å"catastrophic acts with biblical proportions,† (2) takes generations to succeed, and (3) provide both a personal and symbolic redemption for its perpetrators. By elevating their struggles to a cosmic war, religious extremists not only elevate their fight to be one of good against evil, they also impact public consciousness, bringing awareness, and at times sympathy, to

Theoretical Perspective Of Principal Agent Theory

Theoretical Perspective Of Principal Agent Theory According to Random House Dictionary, theory is a coherent group of general propositions used as principles of explanation for a class of phenomena. In the formal meanings of the term, theory has the following three meanings (Frederickson and Smith, 2003): Theory in the natural sciences is the rigorous testing of predictive theorems or assumptions using observable and comparable data. The tested and verified hypotheses constitute the foundation of theories. And theories derived from this process usually serve as a highly reliable direction for behavior. Theories in the social sciences, including public administration, implies the sequence of factual material (history, events, cases, stories, measures of opinion, observations) presented in definitions, concepts, and metaphors to promote understanding. The rigorous and the intuitive observation of social behavior, patterns of communication, and culture is the basis to this theory. The last meaning of theory in public administration is the theories of what should to be. These theories compose the bridge between public administration, political science, and philosophy. The theorists aim at discovering theories that account for, explain, or describe observable trends in behavior and to evaluate the normative cues of such behavior. It is often true that public administration theorists use a mix of the second and third definition of theory. And there is no doubt that theory is the bedrock of understanding of public administration (Frederickson and Smith, 2003). If manuscripts contain no theory, their value is suspect (Whetten, 2000). Hence, an important mission of scholars and educators in the areas of management, health, education, and social work is, on the one hand to conduct researches that contribute knowledge to a scientific discipline, and to apply that knowledge to the practice of management as a profession, on the other (Simon, 1967). To do this well, we need to design our research so that it provides an intimate understanding of the practical problems facing the profession. Equally important, we need to appreciate and strengthen our skills in developing good theory so that research conducted about these problems will advance the knowledge that is relevant to both the discipline and the profession (Van DE Ven, 1989). Therefore, this paper aims at discussing what is theoretical from the perspective of principal-agent theory. It is consisted of four sections: 1) What is Principal-Agent Theory; 2) Whats the theoretical contribution of Principal-Agent Theory; 3) Limitations of Principal-Agent Theory; 4) Conclusion. Principal-Agent Theory One day Deng Xiaoping decided to take his grandson to visit Mao. Call me granduncle, Mao offered warmly. Oh, I certainly couldnt do that, Chairman Mao, the awe-struck child replied. Why dont you give him an apple? suggested Deng. No sooner had Mao done so than the boy happily chirped, Oh thank you, Granduncle. You see, said Deng, what incentives can achieve. (Capitalism, 1984) According to Arrow (1971) and Wilson (1968), during the 1960s and early 1970s, economists investigated risk sharing among individuals or groups. The risk-sharing problem, described in this literature, arises when collaborating parties have different standpoints toward risk. Principal-Agent theory expanded the risk-sharing literature to include what is called agency problem. And agency problem occurs when cooperating parties have different goals, information, and division of labor (Jensen Meckling, 1976). Specifically, principal-agent theory concentrates on the ubiquitous agency-relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work in behalf of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). And principal-agent theory seeks to portray this relationship using the metaphor of a contract (Jensen Meckling, 1976). As a consequence, the central dilemma explored by principal agent theorists is how to stimulate the employee or contractor (agent) to behave in the best interests of the principal (the employer) when the employee or contractor has an informational advantage over the principal and has different interests from the principal. From the agency perspective, most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The basic premise of the theory is that if both parties to the relationship are utility maximisers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In determining the most efficient contract, principal-agent theory brings up certain hypotheses about people, organizations and information. It assumes that agents and principals will act in their self-interest to maximize their own welfare. Agents possess more information than their principals possess. As a result, it identifies two impediments to effective contractual performance: moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard refers to that the agent doesnt put agreed-upon efforts to the tasks. That is, the agent is shirking. Adverse selection refers to the misrepresentation of ability by the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The agent may claim to have certain skills, experiences, or capabilities when he or she is hired. Adverse selection arises because the principal cannot completely verify these skills, experiences, or capabilities either at the time of recruitment or while the agent is working (Eisenhardt, 1989). Two types of problems are especially relevant. One is the agency problem which arises from the conflicting goals of the principal and the agent and from the difficulty/expense involved in verifying the agents behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). The second is the problem of risk-sharing which arises from the different attitudes toward risk on the part of the principal and the agent. The different risk preferences between the principals and agents are likely to lead to different actions. Therefore, the theory concentrates on the contract between the principal and the agent and the ways in which the contract can be made most efficient from the point of view of the principal (V. Nilakant, 1994). Besides, the theory makes two assumptions: that goal conflict exists between principals and agents and that agents have more information than their principals, which results in an information asymmetry between them (Waterman and Meier, 1998). Goal Conflict. In the marketplace, principals and agents clearly have different goals and/or preferences (Waterman and Meier, 1998). Commonly, agents want to make as much money as possible, however principals want to pay as little as possible for services. The same as in the public sector. The government wants to produce as more public goods as possible, while the contractor agents expect to decrease the cost as much as possible. Therefore, in a contract relationship, maximum principals interest couldnt inevitably contribute to the maximum of agents interests. It could even reversely worsen agents advantages, such as less compensation or profit. As a consequence, how to encourage agents to accomplish principals goals at a minimum cost has become a great challenge. Information Asymmetry. As we already have noted, the information asymmetry is a critical assumption of the principal-agent model. The information asymmetry is simply the claim that agents possess more information than their principals possess. (Waterman and Meier, 1998) When the distribution of information between principal and agent is asymmetric, the classic principal-agent problem arises. The problem brought up here is how to avoid information asymmetry so that principals know to what extent the agents have achieved the principals goals, what agents are doing, and what are not done. With these information, principals could better monitor the contract relation and working process to improve organizational performance. In addition to the assumption that partial goal conflict is inherent in any principal-agent relationship, principal-agent theory also presumes that information about the agent is a commodity that can be purchased. (V. Nilakant, 1994) Table 1 presents an overview of principal-agent theory, including key idea, unit of analysis, human assumptions, organizational assumptions, information assumptions, and contracting problems. Table 1 Principal-Agent Theory Overview Key Idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization of information and risk-bearing costs Unit of Analysis Contract between principal and agent Human Assumptions Self-interest Bounded rationality Risk aversion Organizational Assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion Information asymmetry between principal and agent Information Assumptions Information as a purchasable commodity Contracting Problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) Risk sharing Problem Domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing goals and risk preferences (e.g., compensation, regulation, leadership, impression management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing) Source: Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, p.59 Theoretical Contribution of Principal-Agent Theory Principal-Agent theory has been contributing a lot to organization theory and incentive theory. Principal-Agent theory has been the basis for an extensive set of studies relating bureaucracy to elected officials. It also has been extended to presidents decisions to use force and to the Supreme Court and its relationship to lower courts. (Waterman and Meier, 1998) Before discussing the theoretical contribution of principal-agent theory, Id like to talk about what is a good theory. Above all, a good theory is the theory appropriately used. All theories are false. They are, after all, just words and symbols on pieces of paper, about the reality they purport to describe; they are not that reality. So they simplify it. This means we must choose our theories according to how useful they are, not how true they are. (Mintzberg, 2005) Obviously, principal-agent theory is not omnipotent to explain or solve all problems in an organization. It is true only when it is appropriately used. Furthermore, a good theory is practical precisely. A theory to be useful, should accurately describe or depict a real world event or phenomenon. (Frederickson and Smith, 2003) The first section has demonstrated that principal-agent theory fits this requirement. Scholars devoted to this theory have explicitly described what principal-agent is and what it could explain in the real world. Finally, a good theory is insightful and predictive. Theory is insightful when it surprises, when it allows us to see profoundly, imaginatively, unconventionally into phenomena we thought we understoodà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦theory is of no use unless it initially surprises-that is, changes perceptions. (Mintzberg, 2005) From this perspective, principal-Agent theory may not dramatically change perceptions, but it really brings in some new thinking about organizations and incentives. Firstly, Principal-Agent theory reestablishes the importance of incentives and self-interest in organizational thinking. It reminds us that much of organizational life, whether we like it or not, is based on self-interest. (Eisenhardt, 1989) Both principal and agent are usually assumed to be attempting to maximize their own utilities. Agents would not voluntarily produce desires of principal and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to investigate what the agent is actually doing. Hence, it is significant for principals to provide incentives to agents which lead to an alignment of goals between principal and agent, in order to assure that the agents act for principals aims. That is to maximize principals interests rather than impair principals efficiency through agents over possession of information. Secondly, Principal-Agent theory also makes important contributions to organizational thinking, the most important of which is the treatment of information. (Eisenhardt, 1989). In principal-agent theory, information is considered as merchandise: it has a cost, and it can be exchanged and purchased. The implication is that organizations can invest in information systems in order to control agent opportunism, an illustration of which is the executive compensation. And one of the important factors such compensation requires is information systems. It is assumed that richer information systems control managerial opportunism and, therefore, lead to less performance-contingent pay. Board of directors is considered as one particular relevant information system to monitor executive behaviors. When boards provide richer information, compensation is less likely to be based on firm performance. Also, when boards provide richer information, top executives are more likely to engage in behaviors t hat are consistent with stockholders interest. (Eisenhardt, 1989) Besides, to break agents superiority status on information is of great significance to keep balance between principals and agents and to improve agents performance. Moreover, profit sharing has been widely used as an attempt to give employees more opportunities to involve into and to get pleasurable emotion from the organization and to make employees feel they are part of the organization; to increase employees sense of commitment to organization; to increase sense of co-operation between management and subordinates; and to ensure employees benefit from organization profitability. In the public sector, administrators should frequently involve into policy-making process. Participatory management could be an efficient approach to get an alignment of goals of the management and subordinates and to motive employees performance consciousness. In addition, Principal-Agent theory could be used to elucidate hierarchical control of organizations as well (Moe, 1984). Difficulty in monitoring the actions of subordinates/agents, asymmetric information superior status of subordinates/agents, or transactions costs in supervising and verifying the actions of subordinates/agents all can give agents opportunities to escape from principals goals by maximizing agents interests. Typically, principals find means to ameliorate these problems, for example, by relying on signals that warn them when agents step outside certain bounds. (Song, Segal, and Cameron, 1976) Limitations of Principal-Agent Theory Principal-Agent theory, which characterizes relationships that develop and evolve, is supposed to be a dynamic, rather than a static theory (Waterman and Meier, 1998). It provides insightful and predictive theoretical contribution to organization and incentive theory development. Principal-agent theory provides a unique, realistic, and empirically testable perspective on problems of cooperative effort (Eisenhardt, 1989). Besides its theoretical contribution, however, principal-agent theory needs further improvement as the following: Principal-Agent Theory merely displays a partial aspect of the real world, although it is valid, and it also ignores a great amount of organizational complexity. Additional perspectives could contribute to attain the more important complexity (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to Ogden (1993), the highly simplified model of organizational conflict and the contrasting complexity of the mathematics required to provide solutions to the agency problem have been frequently cited as limitations to principal-agent theory. In addition, principal-agent theory could be developed to a richer and more complicated range of contexts. Principal-agent theory studies the relationship between the principal and the agent defined by contract, resting on a basis in economics. Under this theory, relationship problems are explained from a contractual perspective; and solutions derives from the change of contract. However, noneconomic considerations should be emphasized as well, such as cultural, social, psychological, and political. And some scholars have already argued to look at important non-contractual aspects of principal-agent relationship. So, to study principal-agent relationship from non-contractual perspectives is demanded and valuable. Conclusion Starting from an introduction to what is the principal-agent theory and the importance of the theory in public administration, we conclude that the principal-agent theory has contributed a lot to the development of organization theory and incentive theory. Although theoretical significant, principal-agent theory still has its limitations, such as simplified model and ignorance of non-economic factors, which leaves a long way for future development. Nevertheless, this term paper merely provides a short review and summary of principal-agent theory and its theoretical contributions. It is far from a comprehensive and deep study on principal-agent problems and solutions. Much more works are needed to elaborately review this theory.

Characterization in Hawthornes Young Goodman Brown Essay -- Young Goo

  Ã‚  Ã‚   This essay will demonstrate the types of characters present in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s â€Å"Young Goodman Brown,† whether static or dynamic, whether flat or round, and whether protrayed through showing or telling.    R. W. B. Lewis in â€Å"The Return into Rime: Hawthorne† states: â€Å"†¦ there is always more to the world in which Hawthorne’s characters move than any one of them can see at a glance† (77). This is especially true with such flat or two-dimensional characters as are generally found in â€Å"Young Goodman Brown.† These type characters are built on a â€Å"single idea or quality† and are presented without much â€Å"individualizing detail† (Abrams 33). Faith, of course, represents or symbolizes the theological virtue of faith; Goody Cloyse, as a catechism teacher, represents â€Å"goodness†; the unnamed fellow-traveller in the woods is symbolic of â€Å"evil.† Q. D. Leavis explains this symbolic use of characters: â€Å"The first batch of works I specified [including ‘Young Goodman Brown’] is essentially dramatic, its use of language is poetic, and it is symbolic, and richly so, as is the dramatic poet’ s. . . Where the â€Å"symbol† is the thing itself, with no separable paraphrasable meaning as in an allegory: the language is directly evocative (27).    The flat character Faith is not developed like her husband; her dialogue is restricted to the opening few paragraphs. She speaks only four sentences in the entire story:    "Dearest heart," whispered she, softly and rather sadly, when her lips were close to his ear, "pr'ythee, put off your journey until sunrise, and sleep in your own bed tonight. A lone woman is troubled with such dreams and such thoughts, that she's afeard of herself, sometimes. Pray, tarry with me this night, dear husb... ...ng Goodman Brown.† 1835. http://www.cwrl.utexas.edu/~daniel/amlit/goodman/goodmantext.html    Kaul, A.N. â€Å"Introduction.† In Hawthorne – A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by A.N. Kaul. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.    Leavis, Q.D. â€Å"Hawthorne as Poet.† In Hawthorne – A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by A.N. Kaul. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.    Lewis, R. W. B. â€Å"The Return into Time: Hawthorne.† In Hawthorne – A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by A.N. Kaul. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.    Swisher, Clarice. â€Å"Nathaniel Hawthorne: a Biography.† In Readings on Nathaniel Hawthorne, edited by Clarice Swisher. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 1996.    Wagenknecht, Edward. Nathaniel Hawthorne – The Man, His Tales and Romances. New York: Continuum Publishing Co., 1989.

The Person I Admire Most

International law Main articles: Public international law, Conflict of laws, and European Union law Providing a constitution for public international law, the United Nations system was agreed during World War II International law can refer to three things: public international law, private international law or conflict of laws and the law of supranational organisations. Public international law concerns relationships between sovereign nations. The sources for public international law development are custom, practice and treaties between sovereign nations, such as the Geneva Conventions.Public international law can be formed by international organisations, such as the United Nations (which was established after the failure of the League of Nations to prevent the Second World War),[21] the International Labour Organisation, the World Trade Organisation, or the International Monetary Fund. Public international law has a special status as law because there is no international police forc e, and courts (e. g. the International Court of Justice as the primary UN judicial organ) lack the capacity to penalise disobedience. 22] However, a few bodies, such as the WTO, have effective systems of binding arbitration and dispute resolution backed up by trade sanctions. [23] Conflict of laws (or â€Å"private international law† in civil law countries) concerns which jurisdiction a legal dispute between private parties should be heard in and which jurisdiction's law should be applied. Today, businesses are increasingly capable of shifting capital and labour supply chains across borders, as well as trading with overseas businesses, making the question of which country has jurisdiction even more pressing.Increasing numbers of businesses opt for commercial arbitration under the New York Convention 1958. [24] European Union law is the first and, so far, only example of an internationally accepted legal system other than the UN and the World Trade Organisation. Given the tren d of increasing global economic integration, many regional agreements—especially the Union of South American Nations—are on track to follow the same model.In the EU, sovereign nations have gathered their authority in a system of courts and political institutions. These institutions are allowed the ability to enforce legal norms both against or for member states and citizens in a manner which is not possible through public international law. [25] As the European Court of Justice said in the 1960s, European Union law constitutes â€Å"a new legal order of international law† for the mutual social and economic benefit of the member states. [26] The Person I Admire Most International law Main articles: Public international law, Conflict of laws, and European Union law Providing a constitution for public international law, the United Nations system was agreed during World War II International law can refer to three things: public international law, private international law or conflict of laws and the law of supranational organisations. Public international law concerns relationships between sovereign nations. The sources for public international law development are custom, practice and treaties between sovereign nations, such as the Geneva Conventions.Public international law can be formed by international organisations, such as the United Nations (which was established after the failure of the League of Nations to prevent the Second World War),[21] the International Labour Organisation, the World Trade Organisation, or the International Monetary Fund. Public international law has a special status as law because there is no international police forc e, and courts (e. g. the International Court of Justice as the primary UN judicial organ) lack the capacity to penalise disobedience. 22] However, a few bodies, such as the WTO, have effective systems of binding arbitration and dispute resolution backed up by trade sanctions. [23] Conflict of laws (or â€Å"private international law† in civil law countries) concerns which jurisdiction a legal dispute between private parties should be heard in and which jurisdiction's law should be applied. Today, businesses are increasingly capable of shifting capital and labour supply chains across borders, as well as trading with overseas businesses, making the question of which country has jurisdiction even more pressing.Increasing numbers of businesses opt for commercial arbitration under the New York Convention 1958. [24] European Union law is the first and, so far, only example of an internationally accepted legal system other than the UN and the World Trade Organisation. Given the tren d of increasing global economic integration, many regional agreements—especially the Union of South American Nations—are on track to follow the same model.In the EU, sovereign nations have gathered their authority in a system of courts and political institutions. These institutions are allowed the ability to enforce legal norms both against or for member states and citizens in a manner which is not possible through public international law. [25] As the European Court of Justice said in the 1960s, European Union law constitutes â€Å"a new legal order of international law† for the mutual social and economic benefit of the member states. [26]